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CHAPTER TWO

A FRESH RIFF ON J. DENNY
WEAVER'S A-THEOLOGY
OR PROLEGOMENON TO A
STEWARDSHIP RHETORIC
Susan L. Biesecker and Jason R. Moyer
Many people tell [him that his] style is [horrific]; it is kind of different, but
let's get specific.1
-KRSOne

INTRODUCTION
J. Denny Weaver's "theology" is irritating. Its style is impolite, its
substance improper. Weaver writes, albeit in postmodern fashion, as
one who speaks the truth. Although he recognizes that his truth is
particular to an Anabaptist perspective, he also notes that every other
truth-claim is similarly particular. However, while refusing to adopt
common responses to this condition-polite tolerance, on the one
hand, or self-righteous fundamentalism, on the other-Weaver nevertheless confesses that his truth has universal aspirations.2
Further, Weaver does not present his truth in an objective manner.
Rather, his style is that of the advocate of a truth that carries definite
29
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implications not only for our collective politics but also for our individual salvation. Weaver's style is impolite also in the sense that it is
not deferential to theological authority, whether that authority derives from tradition and takes the form of orthodoxy or grows out of
privileged institutional positions and follows methodological prot~
col. He does not assume that well-recognized and respected theologIcal approaches have any special claim on truth. On the contrary, he
views such approaches with skepticism, assuming that their respectability has more to do with privilege than insight. Weaver also
does not seek our approval; instead, he demands our assent. Rather
than rationalize our present beliefs or practices, he challenges us with
the truth, demands that we agree, and calls us to be transformed.
Finally, Weaver's style is relentlessly argumentative. He welcomes others' rebuttals as opportunities to sharpen his case, confident that ultimately he can win any argument. Moreover, he never
tires of making his case and will make it anytime, anywhere, to anyone. In all these ways Weaver's theological style is presumptuous, irreverent, and contentious-in short, impolite.
The substance of Weaver's theology is improper when measured
against the standards of traditional theology. Weaver's theology does
not take up in systematic fashion the traditional categories of theology like Christology, soteriology, ecclesiology, pneumatology, etc., to
theorize them in relation to each other for a comprehensive understanding. Instead, his theology speaks to traditional theological categories as a response to perceived crises within the church. For instance, Weaver takes up the atonement not to develop some larger
theological system but to respond to a problem that he sees- namely,
that the church's understanding of the atonement authorizes viole~ce. I~ this sense Weaver's theology is deeply historical rather than
pnmanly philosophical.
Additionally, to resolve the problems he identifies, Weaver does
not turn to classical theological systems from which he might construct an alternative. Instead, he turns to Anabaptist sources, not as
"heroes to emulate or principles to adopt," but as historical examples
whose "struggle for faithfulness" yields a truthful interpretive lens
for understanding Jesus and his relationship to the world. 3 Through
this interpretive lens we can read the true story of Jesus which, if we
will choose to enter it, provides a genuine Christian posture from
which we may engage the world.
Not only are the sources for Weaver's theology atypical in the
sense that they are historical rather than philosophical, they are also
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sources once (and by some still) considered heretical: Anabaptists
who did not produce their own "proper" theology; who had no w1ified theological, sociological, or political origin; who had no reputable spokesperson (like a Luther, Calvin, or Zwingli); who were
itinerants jotting down apocalyptic musings while on the run from
the authorities; and who even today resist easy categorization-neither Catholic nor Protestant, neither evangelical nor fundamentalist.
Non-systematic, deeply historical, and based in "heretical" sources,
we could say that more than a theology, Weaver's is an a-theology.4
Weaver's a-theology not only breaks with the conventions and
protocols of traditional theology, it also upends the purpose and disrupts the substance of proper theology. Weaver challenges the primary purpose of traditional theology, to reveal the true nature of God,
by insisting that theology is always political. For Weaver theology is
never purely theoretical; it is also always a practice. That is, Weaver is
always interested in what theology does by way of what it says.
In Keeping Salvation Ethical, for instance, Weaver shows that the
politics of theology, in this case nineteenth-century MeIU10nite atonement theology, justified violence. Thus, he argues that "nineteenth-

cen t ury Mennonite atonemen t theofog1J con tained a fa ten t threa t to the peace
theology and to the peace practice of succeeding Mennonite generations
(italics in original). "5 In his later study, The Nonviolent Atonement,
Weaver continues to develop a corrective to those nineteenth-century
theologies that authorized violence. His answer is what he calls narrative Christus Victor atonement theology, a theology which, he argues, is inherently nonviolent and, therefore, incapable of authorizing violence:
Above all, in narrative Christus Victor salvation and justice are
no longer based on the violence of justice equated with punishment. Salvation does not depend on balancing sin by retributive
violence. Making right no longer means the violence of punishment. Justice and salvation are accomplished in narrative Christus Victor by doing justice and participating in God's saving
work. 6
So important are the politics of theology for Weaver that his starting point for producing theology is by definition political. Specifically, rather than begin with the nature of God as would a traditional
theology, Weaver's theology begins with Jesus and, moreover, not
just any Jesus. Weaver's theology finds its logical origin in the nonviolent Jesus of John Howard Yoder's The Politics of Jesus. Thus, for in-
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stance, Weaver's theology of atonement takes as its foundational
premise the nonviolent politics of Jesus:
The working assumption in development of this model [of narrative Christus Victor] is that the rejection of violence, whether
the direct violence of the sword or the systemic violence of
racism or sexism, should be visible in expressions of Christology
and atonement?
With a nonviolent political Jesus at its center, Weaver's "theology" disrupts the substance of proper theology by disturbing the normative status of the so-called ecumenical creeds. Traditionally the
creeds are understood as a collection of uncontestable truths that
serve as the foundation of Christendom. For Weaver the creeds are
true yet problematic because they do nothing to shape the church in
the direction of Jesus' teachings on the rejection of violence. Because
they are silent on the teachings of Jesus, he argues, they do not do the
political work that is needed-namely, to help the church witness to
the nonviolent reign of God. So troubling is this argument for proper
theology that it is worth quoting at length:
Recall that Nicea's central claim is that Jesus is "one substance"
or "one being" with the Father. Recall that the formula of Chalcedon proclaimed Jesus as "fully God and fully man." With
awareness of the nonviolent character of the reign of God made
visible in the narrative of Jesus and expressed in narrative Christus Victor, I simply ask, "What is there about the formulas of
Nicea and Chalcedon that express the character of the reign of
God, in particular its nonviolent character?" "What is there
about these formulas that can shape the church that would follow Jesus in witnessing to the reign of God in the world?" Answer: virtually nothing. If all we know of Jesus is that he is "one
substance with the Father," and that he is "fully God and fully
man," there is nothing there that expresses the ethical dimension
of being Christ-related, nothing there that would shape the
church so that it can be a witness to the world. When these formulas serve as the summary touchstone of Christian faith, there
is nothing of the particularity of Jesus to enable the Christ-related person to shape the church as an extension of Jesus' presence in the world. s
As texts that, according to Weaver, fail to recognize the centrality
of the rejection of violence not only to Jesus but to the reign of God, the
creeds should not be taken as they have been for so long as defining
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statements about what it means to be a Christian, even if the content
of their specific propositions is accurate.
Challenging the creeds in this way renders them inadequate for
current ecumenical efforts which presume that a condition of possibility for catholicity is an affirmation of the creeds as the uni versal
and common core for all Christian theology, belief, and practice. Mark
Noll observes that one of the great rifts within the Christian faiththat is, between Catholics and evangelicals-has largely been sutured
by the growing recognition among these two groups that they share
in common core beliefs articulated by the creeds. Thus Noll writes:
Among evangelicals and Catholics who are open to cooperation
there now exists a broad and deep foundation of agreement on
the central teachings of Christianity. Such evangelicals and
Catholics affirm together the Trinity, the sinfulness of humanity,
the saving love of God extended to sinners in the person and
work of Jesus Christ, the redeeming power of the Holy Spirit to
change men and women into servants of God, and the wholesome integrity of God's law.. . . Differences on basic Christian
convictions between Catholics and evangelicals fade away as if
to nothing when compared to secular affirmations about the nature of humanity and the world. 9
If the church's catholicity depends on core documents like the
apostles' Creed or the evangelical "four spiritual laws" that omit the
central truth of Jesus-the rejection of the sword-then the project of
ecumenism excludes the most important feature of Christian faith .
Thus, Weaver's tl1eology disturbs the ecumenical project by suggesting that the unity it buys comes at the price of marginalizing the essential truth of Christianity-God's rejection of violence.
From the perspective of style, Weaver's theology is impolite.
From the perspective of form, it is improper. From the perspective of
substance, it is political. From the perspective of ecumenical efforts, it
is troublemaking. Indeed, in all these ways it is irritating.

TRUTH TELLING

I came to you in weakness with great fear and trembling. My message and
my preaching were not with wise and persuasive words, but with a
demonstration of the Spirit's power, so that your faith might not rest on
human wisdom, but on God's power.
-Paul of Tarsus (1 Cor. 2:3-5, NIV)
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To better contextualize the character of Weaver's irritating, imp roper theology, w e turn to the work of the French philosopher,
Michel Foucault. Throughout his writings, Foucault seeks to d escribe
the ways the particular discourses of psychiatry, punishment, sexuality, and even grammar discipline our subjectivity by enabling us to
speak, but only according to the modes authorized by these discourses. In his study, Fearless Speech, Foucault takes up a question
raised in the third volume of his History of Sexuality: How is it that,
even as individual subjectivities are constituted and spoken by particular discourses, we might (and in fact do) nevertheless say something else, speaking in ways that are disruptive of available modes of
making sense. To pursue this question, Foucault, as is his wont, turns
to the ancient Greeks, seeking in them an idea or a practice foreign. to
us. What he finds is the practice of parrhesia, or truth telling, a pr~chc.e
that disturbs our still-modern understanding of truth by makmg It
possible for us to imagine speaking truth to power even without secure epistemological foundations.
According to Foucault, the ancient Greek practice of parrhesia or
truth telling speaks truth not by way of a correspondence betwe~n,
say, word and reality but, instead, through a set of relationships
among self, power, and morality that constitute the parrhesiastes, ~r
truth teller. For Foucault, what this ancient Greek practice gives us IS
a way to tell truth that transgresses our problems with a modern understanding of truth by constituting a certain ethos or position within
language. and culture that enables truth telling. lO As we will see
below, thIS demanding ethos requires that the truth teller occupy a
particular position within language and culture characterized by
frankness, truth, danger, criticism, and duty.
By frankness Foucault means a correspondence between thought
and word. The truth-teller is someone "who says everything that
[she] has in mind: [she] does not hide anything, but opens [her] heart
and mind completely to other people through [her] discourse."u
The parrhesiastes practices frankness because she understands herself to speak the truth. By truth Foucault means a correspondence between what is believed and what is true. For Foucault, the truthteller is someone who "says what is true because [she] knows it is
true; and [she] knows that it is true because it really is true." 12 However, the guarantor of the truth-teller's access to truth is not a modern epistemology but, instead, her moral quality. Moreover, the sign
of the truth-teller's high moral quality is her courage: "If there is a
kind of 'proof' of the sincerity of the parrhesiastes, it is [her] courage.
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The fact that a speaker says something dangerous- different from
what the majority believes- is a strong indication that [she] is a par-

rhesiastes."
By danger, Foucault signals that parrhesia always involves taking
a risk. For Foucault, a parrhesiastes is one who in speaking the truth
takes a risk because she speaks that truth to power. That risk mayor
may not be life-threatening. It might involve anything from the loss of
popularity, to the loss of a friendship, to the loss of life. In any case, the
parrhesiastes is one who makes herself vulnerable by telling someone
in power a truth they do not want to hear. Moreover, she does so because she would rather suffer on behalf of truth than gain security
through falsehood . As Foucault puts it, the truth-teller takes this risk
~ec~use "When you accept the parrhesiastic game in which your own
life IS exposed, you are taking up a specific relationship to yourself:
you risk death to tell the truth instead of reposing in the security of a
life where the truth goes unspoken."l3
. What makes the truth that the parrhesiastes tells potentially obJectionable to the other in power and, therefore, risky is its critical
character. When the parrhesiastes confesses a truth critical of herself,
she risks punishm ent from the other in power. When the parrhesiastes tells a truth critical of the other in power, she risks the wrath of
t~e other. Such risk is an integral part of truth telling for Foucault
S111ce the truth-teller is always in a subordinate relationship to the
other: "[p]arrhesia is a form of criticism, either toward another or to~~rd oneself, but always in a situation where the speaker or confessor
IS 111 a position of inferiority with respect to the interlocutor. The parrhesiastes is always less powerful than the one with whom [she]
speaks. The parrhesia comes from 'below,' as it were, and is directed
toward 'above.'''14
The parrhesiastes takes the risk of speaking a critical truth to
power because she knows it to be her duty to correct an error that she
Or the other has made. However, in order for her to exercise her duty,
she must choose it. For Foucault, parrhesia can n ever be coerced by
another even as it is it undertaken out of an intense feeling of obligatio~:. "To criticize a friend or a sovereign is an act of parrhesia ins~far
as ~t IS a duty to help a friend who does not recognize his wrongdo~1g,
or 111sofar as it is a duty toward the city to help the king to better hlmself as a sovereign. Parri1esia is thus related to freedom and to duty."1 5
Parrhesia, in summary, is:
a kind of verbal activity where the speaker has a specific relation
to truth through frankn es ,a ce rtain relati nship to his own life
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through danger, a certain type of relation to himself or other people through criticism (self-criticism or criticism of other people),
and a specific relation to moral law through freedom and duty.
More precisely, parrhesia is a verbal activity in which a speaker
expresses his personal relationship to truth, and risks his life because he recognizes truth telling as a duty to improve or help
other people (as well as [herself]).16
Initially we might be surprised to find Foucault, a postmodern
philosopher of great renown, advancing a characterization of truth
telling. As conventionally understood, postmodern philosophy poses
a profound challenge to truth or at least to modern conceptions of a
stable, coherent, and universal truth. Yet this text describes an ethos
conducive to truth telling. However, truth telling for Foucault does
not involve establishing an epistemological link between language
and reality, but rather cultivating a mode of being within discourse
that makes possible a move beyond conventional wisdom toward the
articulation of something else, something new, something true. The
conditions of possibility for that ethos are frankness, truth, danger,
criticism, and duty.

WEAVER ' S A-THEOLOGY AS TRUTH TELLING

If Anabaptists, Catholics, and Protestants shared as much in common as
[Arnold] Snyder's approach, it would then follow that neither side understood the issue at stake (pun intended!).17
-J. Denny Weaver
With Foucault's retrieval of the ancient Greek practice of parrhesia
in mind,
may read Weaver's a-theology as parrhesia and Weaver as
a parrheslastes. Indeed, the features of parrhesia make for an apt characterization of the style and substance of Weaver's a-theology.
Earlier when we were arguing that Weaver's style is impolite, we
defended that claim by pointing out that it is relentlessly argumentative. Also in that connection we noted that he actively seeks out opportunities to argue his a-theological positions. Now we may say that
Weaver's style or, better put, his a-theological ethos, exhibits frankness. Like the parrhesiastes, Weaver displays a correspondence between his thought and speech. It is as if he is incapable of holding
back his arguments. Weaver exhibits the quality of frankness because
he knows that he speaks the truth. There is nothing in Weaver's style

v:e
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to indicate that he hesitates about the truth he espouses. The only
question for him is how to present that truth in the most logically
compelling way possible.
When we earlier argued that the substance of Weaver's a-theology is improper, we said that it did not meet traditional standards of
t~~ology because it is neither systematic nor ahistorical, neither apolIhcal nor creedal. Instead, we said that Weaver's a-theology is always
shaped by contemporary exigencies within the church. Weaver does
not focus on developing a coherent theological system that will stand
the test of time but, instead, on faithfully continuing that historical
struggle to make the church into the visible instantiation of God's
reign within the contingencies of the present. Given Weaver's Anabaptist understanding that the church makes the reign of God visible
when it presents itself as an alternative community faithful to the
nonviolent politics of Jesus, Weaver's a-theology is thoroughly political. Finally, we noted that Weaver's a-theology disrupts the status of
the creeds by Simultaneously drawing our attention to the fact that
the c~eeds say nothing on behalf of nonviolence and insisting that
nonvlOlence be at the center of all things theological. For all these ~ea
sons, then, we called Weaver's an a-theology-that is to say, an 1mproper theology.
As such, Weaver's a-theology is dangerous. It is dangerous.for
Weaver as a theologian because it breaks the rules of the theolog1cal
~uild. In advanCing his a-theology, then, Weaver risks marginalizahOn?r worse among proper theologians. Further, Weaver's a-theology 1S dangerous in the sense that it speaks truth to power. He tells
theologicu.1s something that they do not want to hear-namely, th~t all
theology 1S political and, further, that theirs does not have the nght
politics. In addition, as someone who bases his improper theology on
the thinking of heretics and, in addition, locates himself in a con~em
porary religious tradition often taken to be sectarian, Weaver fll1ds
himself in an inferior position with respect to other theologians. ~s
so~eone who challenges the theological guild from what that gUlld
~en~es as a 'sectarian' position, it can be said that Weaver ~dopts an
mfenor position through his a-theology and, thus, may nghtly be
called critical in the sense Foucault means in his discussion of parrhesiastes .
.A~ the crux of Weaver's a-theology is the necessary .choice that all
Chnshans must make at the foot of the crosS and in the lIght of the resurrection between living according to the reign of God or ac~epting
the rule of the not-yet-reign-of-God. For Weaver the atonement 1S not a
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matter of the sacrifice of divine flesh for human sin which, accord~g
to Anselmian substitutionary atonement, grants us God's .grace ~:e
Weaver's a-theology the Christ event represents the inbreakm~ o~
reign of God which creates an aporia or impasse that all Chnshha.ns
.
. S 1 .
b liges a c 01ce
must resolve by w ay of the1r own chOIce. a va t~on 0
for salabo ut faith in Jesus' victory over the powers. Wh1le necessar~ h ice
vation, however, this choice is insufficient. H aving mad e this c °th
the Christian must then live accordingly. She must ';itne.ss to be
truth in which she has faith- that the reign of God is vlctono u s - .y
living according to its logic rather than according to the logics of s~
and death. Thus, all that she thinks, says, and does should correspon
to that reign-of-God logic.
ly
·S own a-theology sen.ous 1y, w h 1'ch he suret 11
If Weave r ta k es h 1
d oes, then he is obliged to tell others the truth that he knows, ~o e
t
them that their salvation depends not only on recognizing the ultun a e
supremacy of the reign of God but also having d one so, to w itness to
. .
'
h . cehe
that chOlce m all that they do. He is obliged to tell this trut s111
has himself made this choice. Thus, everything he thinkS, says1'. or
. Iu d mg
' 1:us
. a-t11.eology, m ust serve as h is witness. Truth tel 1l1g
d oes, mc
the
is a matter of his own salvation . It is also a matter of his duty to k
other. Knowing as he does that the fate of the other's soul is at sta e,
Weaver is obliged to tell the other what she does not w ant to h earnamely, that discipleship and the conduct of life is a matter of salvation. Or, put another way, faith, although necessary, is insufficient.
Recalling what Foucault says about the relationship betwee~
freedom and obligation, we may say both that Weaver's a-theology ~
. parr h eS1astic
'
. tes . It 1S
a t onemen t 1S
and that Weaver is a parrh eS1as
parrhesiastic, first, because it depends upon the Christian's freedo~
to choose whether to tell the other the truth. The Christian has the op
tion to wit~ess to the ~eig~ of God or not. It is parrhesiasti~, seco;~~
because th1S truth tellmg mvolves confronting the other WIth so
thing she does not want to hear. Finally Weaver is a parrhesias teS
since he freely chooses to tell this discomforting truth to the other f~r
.
b ehalf of her salvation that he freely engages ;'"
thlS
h er bene f~'t . I t 1S?n
u'
a-theologIcal wItness to the reign of God.
We o~e.ne.d t~is paper with the claim that J. Denny Weaver'~ atheology 1Suntatmg because its style is impolite and its substance Irnproper. We supported our claim by showing how Weaver's style an~
substance may easily be read in that way. With a turn to FoucaulttS
· 0 f parrh eS1a,
' h owever, we have a ttempted to w rite a "fres 1.
rea d mg
riff, " or a new take on that easy read. Thus, we h ave argued that
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Weaver's a-theology should not be read as simply irritating but, instead, should be unders tood as parrhesiastic because it frankly criticizes power out of a sen se of duty even in the face of danger. Having
said this much we also want to say that neither Weaver's parrhesiastic
a-theology nor his e thos as a parrhesiastes are unique to him. On the
contra ry, the ch a rac te ris ti s w e ha ve id ntified in Wea ver 's a-theology may also be read amid many sixte nth-century A naba ptist tex ts.

SIXTEENTH-CENTURY
ANABAPTISM AS TRUTH TELLING
Two Dominican friars also ca llie to her, tile one os a confessor, and the
other os all ill stl'1lctor. The lotter showed her tile crll cijix, sayillg: "See,
here is your Lord and your God.' She an swered: 'This is not my God; the

cross by which J have been redeemed, is a different one. This is a wooden
god; throw iIilll into tl1e fire, and warJII yourselves witllilim.,,18
- Martyrs Mirror
Q lles. " What do YOll lIold concernillg the lIoly oil ?"
Ans. " Oil is g ood for salad, or to oil your shoes with . ,, 19

-Martyrs Mirror
The origins of Anabaptist truth t lling may be found among the
stories recounted in Martyrs Mirror. In those stories w e hear of Anaba~tists who willingly and frequently defied church-state authorities
by lI1structing those authorities in what they kn ew to be the truth of
the Christian faith. For this truth telling, thousands were executed by
the authorities and many more were severely tortured or exiled. One
such story goes like this:
About the year 1553 ... a shopkeeper, named Simon, . . . stOOd. in
the marketplace, to sell his wares. When the priests passed him
with their idol, this Simon did not dare give divine honor to this
idol made by human hand s, but, according to the tes timony of
God presented in the holy Scriptures, would worship and serve
only the Lord his God. He was therefore apprehended by the
maintainers of the Roman antichrist, and examined in the faith,
which he freely confessed, rejecting their self-invented infant
baptism together with all human commandments, and holding
fa s t only to the tes timony of the Word of God; hence he was sentenc d to d ath by th e ne mi es of the trLIth, a nd was thu s led
without the city, and burnt for the testimony of Jes us. 20
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In his defiant stance on the street that day, Simon frankly spoke
the truth about idols by refusing to perform an act of subservience. t~
them. He further instructed the authorities in that truth, thereby cr~t~
cizing them, by not bowing down to them. His was an esp~cially VISIble critique that, according to the account and the engravmg that accompanies it, was known to him, to the authorities, and to all assembled on the street that day and could not go unanswered. Answered it
was, of course, by his prompt execution.
Speaking of the hundreds of Anabaptist martyr stories he had
compiled for The Martyrs Mirror, Thieleman van Braght writes the following about the freedom and even boldness with which these truth
tellers went forth to their executions for their frankness and truth:
Yet to look upon all this [death and torture] will not cause real
sadness, for though the aspect is dismal according to the body,
the soul will nevertheless rejoice in it, seeing that not one of all
those who were slain preferred life to death, since life often was
proffered them on condition that they depart from the constancy
of their faith. But this they did not desire; on the contrary, many of
them went boldly onward to meet death; some even hastened to
outstrip others, that they might be the first, who did not shrink
from suffering anything the tyrants could devise, nay more than
could be thought possible for a mortal man to end ure. 21
Simon's story was not unique, Braght tells us. Despite diff~renc~s
in the details among the stories recounted in Martyrs Mirror, Slffion s
story is paradigmatic of the rest, at least in terms of truth telling. As
we said above, then, Weaver's particular parrhesia and his ethos as a
parrhesiastes can be understood as a reiteration of the thousands of
sixteenth-century Anabaptist parrhesiastes who preceded him. ..
Reading Weaver through Foucault allows us to recognize that It IS
not the case that Weaver has a theology that just happens to be argued
~.an irritating .way. Weaver's theology is irritating precisely beca.u~e
It IS a truth tellmg. And truth telling is always irritating because It IS
always antagonistic, which in this case is to say that it is contrary to
the interests of the ~~wers. Fin~lly, this reading via Foucault h~s enabled us to say that It IS antagonIstic in this way for reasons of faIth.
THE GIFT OF TRUTH

What God-word brings, may we embrace; Success and suff'ring greet us;
confronting evil face to face, as scorn and anger meet us. For freedom's
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sake we bend we break, a sign to ev'ry nation that we have found a solid
ground; God's Word our sure foundation. 22
-Ausbund Hymn
In Fearless Speech Foucault draws attention to the fact that for ancient Greeks, unlike moderns, the acquisition of truth was not a problem. For moderns who, since Descartes, are modern insofar as they
are suspicious of truth, the method by which truth is obtained is the
central problem. In modern epistemology truth is secured through
the proper and orderly application of reason, logic, and evidence, By
contrast, for ancient Greeks who were not suspicious of truth, their
concern was not with method but with the moral character of the one
speaking truth. As Foucault puts it:
[sJince Descartes, the coincidence between belief and truth is obtained in a certain (mental) evidential experience. For the
Greeks, however, the coincidence between belief and truth does
not take place in a (mental) experience, but in a verbal activity,
namely, parrhesia.23
As we noted in our earlier discussion of truth as a dimension of
parrhesia, the activity of truth telling depends on the moral character
of the truth teller rather than on proper method. To quote Foucault
again: "In the Greek conception of parrhesia ... there does not seem to
be ayroblem about the acquisition of the truth since such truth-havmg IS guaranteed by the possession of certain moral qualities: when
someone has certain moral qualities, then that is the proof that he has
access to truth-and vice versa."24 Thus, the condition of possibility
for parrhesia is an ethos understood not in the generiC sense of credib'li
. the more particular sense of moral character. 25
I ty b ut m
. Earlier we noted that in recovering the activity of parrhesia (as it
mclud~s frankness, truth, danger, criticism, an~ duty), Fou~a~lt
ma~es It possible for us to imagine a subject posItion f.rom wlthm
Whl~~ contemporary modes of making sense may be dI~r~pt~d. In
addItion we indicated that imagining such a subject posItion IS el: abled by the fact that parrhesia circumvents the modern problematic
of truth.
Now.we see how this is so. By recuperating a decidedly premodern practIce of truth, Foucault shifts the question from one of truth to
tru~h telling, from one of knowledge to ethos, from one of method to
ethIcs. In so doing he makes it possible for us postmoderns, who are
no more capable of confidence in the modern regime of truth than we
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are able simply to give up its methods for securing truth, to imagine a
way to speak truth to power.
For sixteenth-century Anabaptists, the acquisition o~ tru~ was
also not the problem. Like the ancient Greeks, the Anabaptists dId n~~
doubt the truth that they knew. Further, as we argued above, they t~ .
that truth as parrhesiastes- that is as truth tellers who frankly crz~
cized the powers in the face of danger and out of a sense?f duty. k
though they shared the practice of parrhesia with the anCIent Gr~eb s
and in this sense occupied a similar ethos, their ethos was shape.
its relationship to a peculiar truth that was not derived but awaIte ,
not fixed but messianic, not discovered but given.
Unlike modern truth, derived from the rigors of logical dedu~
tion, empirical verification, and objective scrutiny, Anabaptist truth IS
collectively awaited. Following the Rule of Paul, sixteenth-cent~ry
Anabaptists sought truth in the congregation gathered around Scnpture and awaiting the Holy Spirit. According to John Howard Yoder,
"[ilt is a basic novelty in the discussion of hermeneutics to say that a
text is best understood in a congregation. This meanS that the tools of
literary analysis do not suffice; that the Spirit is an interpreter of what
a text is about only when Christians are gathered in readiness to hear
it speak to their current needs and concerns."26 Further, Yoder argues,
this mode of truth-seeking implies that every member of the congregation has the potential to speak truthP In other words, every member of the congregation has the potential to speak as a parrhiastes.
Furthermore, the congregation is not bound either by creedal st~te
ments or tradition as it seeks the truth. In such a context for seekmg
truth, there is no historical a priori ground by which truth may be secured. 28 T~e Holy Spirit is in charge of those gathered and leads the
congregatlon toward what may likely be an altogether new understanding of the text and thus of truth.
An additional implication of this mode of seeking truth is th~t
truth is not fixed or static but arrives by way of the Holy Spirit and IS
on the move. It does not keep repeating itself but often makes unexpected claims. This seems to be the point that sixteenth-century Anabaptist Pilgram Marpeck makes When he writes about the nature of
the truth of the cross: "The living cross and hand of Christ shows the
w~y, do~s. n?t stand immovable in one place, never has and never
WIll, for It IS Itself the way from which the truth comes and is the truth
from which life comes. This life comes from faith and faith gives birth
to all virtue and the knowledge of Christ."29 Like the cross, all Christian truth within this view is understood as messianic, as ongoing
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revelation that, in not being ahistorical, is subject to change. As such,
this sort of truth may at any time throw interpretive tradition, conventional wisdom and, inevitably, social relations into crisis.
Further, this truth comes not by way of ruthless examination, but
as a patiently awaited gift from God. 3D Sixteenth-century Anabaptists
focused their attention not on the question of right belief or orthodoxy, but rather on right relationship or obedience to messianic truth.
To quote Marpeck again: "The spiritual in Christ are committed to
obedience to the Father in patience and love through the Word even
as Christ, the Righteous one, became obedient unto death."31 Again,
the problem is not truth, its status, or its acquisition, but instead one's
relationship to God's gift of messianic truth. For the Anabaptist parr~esia~tes the practice of truth telling involves not only a certain relatIonshlp to the powers to which one speaks truth out of duty, but also
a certain relationship to an unruly truth received as a gift from the
One who gives all.
So far we have argued that we should read Weaver's a-theology
as parrhesia. Further, we have argued that doing so is important because it enables us to see that his arguments are not merely irritating.
~~ther, the manner in which they are made, their rhetoric, similar as
It IS to the practice of parrhesia among ancient Greeks, is a form of
not-modern truth telling. Weaver's practice of truth telling is important for us in these postmodern days because, as we argued earlier, it
shows a way to get around the modern problem of truth through
ethics. The truth teller tells the truth not by way of a certain methodologism but via a certain moral ethos. Thus, noticing how Weaver
and other Anabaptists tell the truth in this way can put us on the track
of how we might also speak truth to power in our postmodern context.
Along the way we noted two distinctives of Anabaptist truth
telling: first, that the truth Anabaptists tell is always received as an
unruly truth in the sense that it is a truth on the move; and second,
that it comes as a gift from God. 32 Thus, Anabaptist truth telling is not
~he same as the truth telling that Foucault describes. Because we are
1~1terested in enabling truth telling in our postmodern times in a distInctly Anabaptist manner, we want to advocate an Anabaptist ethos
of truth telling that presumes that the truth told is received as an unruly gift of God. In preparation for that argument we want first to say
something about our relationship to God's gifts and about rhetoric.
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STEWARDSHIP

Like good stewards of the manifold grace of God, serve one another with
whatever gift each of you has received. Whoever speaks must ~o so as one
speaking the venj words of God; whoever serves must do so with ~he
strength that God supplies, so that God may be glorified in all thtngs
through Jesus Christ. To him belong the glory and the power forever and
ever. Amen. 33
- Peter of Jerusalem (1 Pet. 4:10-11)
Thinking about God's gifts and our relationship to them is an ancient preoccupation at least as old as the Judeo-Christian story of the
origins of creation. In the first account of creation, for instance, we
read the following: "God said, 'See, I have given you every plant
yielding seed that is upon the face of all the earth, and every tree
with seed in its fruit; you shall have them for food. And to every
beast of the earth and to every bird of the air, and to everything that
creeps on the earth, everything that has the breath of life, I have
given every green plant for food'" (Gen. 1:29-30). Thus God cre~tes
all and gives all to human beings. But even as the whole creation IS a
gift of God, God retains ownership of all. The Psalmist writes: "The
earth is the Lord's, and the fullness thereof; the world, and they that
dwell therein" (Ps. 24:1) . In the context of God's creation, gift, and
ownership of all, human beings are positioned as stewards of the
creation.34
We learn something of what it means to be a steward in Genesis
when man is placed within the context of that gift: "The Lord G?~
took the man and put him in the garden of Eden to fill it and keep It
(Gen. 2:1.5). The r~sponsibility of human beings as stewards .is not to
cr~at~ thmgs, but mstead,like gardeners, to cultivate God's gIftS from
withm a posture of submission. Genesis' message is
that the responsibility of every man is like the gardener'S, t?
know that though he creates nothing he is responsible to cultivate what God has given; that growth cannot be forced by any
human haste and that the silent process of the divine unfolding
~ust be trusted; and that those who have grown most in grace,
lIke m~n who must have their gardens grow in sun and rain and
changmg seasons, will be most humble in themselves and most
reverent before the unfolding mysteries of God.35
The steward of God's gift who submits and cultivates displays an
ethos called for by her relationship to the one who creates, gives, and

A FRESH RIFF ON J. DENNY WEAVER'S A-THEOLOGY

45

owns the creation. Since Anabaptists understand truth to be a gift of
God, we suggest a particular practice of truth telling that presumes a
posture of stewardship in relationship to truth.

RHETORIC

For Jews demand signs and Greeks desire wisdom, but we proclaim Christ
crucified, a stumbLing bLock to Jews and fooLishness to Gentiles, but to
those who are the caLLed, both Jews and Greeks, Christ the power of God
and the wisdom of God. For God's fooLishness is wiser than human wisdom, and God's weakness is stronger than In/man strength.
-Paul of Tarsus (I Cor. 1: 22-25)
As Foucault acknowledges throughout FearLess Speech, truth
telling is rhetorical. "Parrhesia," according to Foucault, "is thus a sort
?f 'fi.gure' among rhetorical figures, but with this characteristic: that it
IS wlthout any figure since it is completely natural. Parrhesia is the
zero degree of those rhetorical figures which intensify the emotions of
the aUdience."36 As a mode of speaking that disavows its rhetoricity,
?arr~esia is especially rhetoricaP7 But to say that parrhesia is rhetorlCalls only a start because, as Foucault points out, there are multiple
rhetorics or multiple ways of thinking about the relationship between
truth telling and rhetoric.
Considering the two predominant views on rhetoric and truth
from the ancient Greek context, for instance, we see that truth telling,
~ollowing Plato, may be understood as the opposite of rhetoric-that
IS as speech that is transparent to truth rather than veiled in eloquence. Or truth telling, following Aristotle, may be understood as
ma~e possible by rhetoric when two opposing viewpoints are set
agamst one another in debate so that the audience, given its propensi.ty to appreciate when a position has been demonstrated, can recogl1lze the position that is true. But rather than adopt either of these
philosophical perspectives on rhetoric that understands truth to be,
by definition, static, we take up a sophistic view of rhetoric since, ~s
we shall see, its view of rhetoric in relationship to an unruly truth IS
well suited to Anabaptist parrhesia.
For the Sophists, who were itinerant teachers of rhetoric throughout the Greek city-states in the fifth-century BCE, truth understood in
absolute terms is at best elusive. According to Protagoras, a leading
Sophist, knowledge about ultimate things like the gods is unavailable
to human beings: "Concerning the gods," Protagoras argues, "I can-
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not know either that they exist or that they do not exist, or what form
they might have, for there is much to prevent one 'kn
s owing'. the obscurity of the subjec~ and the sh?rtness of ~an'~ life:"38 Similarly, ~~~
gias, another promment SOphIst of the hme, IS saId to have arg
that nothing exists but that even if anything exists it is inc~~~rehen
sible and, further, that even if anything is comprehensible, It IS mcommunicable. 39 What human beings do have access to are the human
truths (or doxa) that emerge relative to their own experience and
which, therefore, vary from place to place and time to time. Thus, Protagoras writes that "Of all things the measure is man, of things that
are that they are, and of things that are not that they are no t ."40
For the Sophists, then, truth is elusive on two registers: first, at the
level of an absolute, Truth is elusive since even if it exists, human beings have no access to it; and second, at th~ level of human experience,
truth is elusive since it changes over time and space. Insof~r as Sophistic truth is not static like philosophical truth but, instead, maccessible and ever changing, we may say that it is also unruly.41
Not only did the Sophists understand truth to be unruly. More
importantly for our purposes they thought that it was the job of rhetoric to encourage its unruliness. In a fragment attributed to Prota?~
r~s, ~or ~stance, he articulates the sophistic principle that rhetonc ~
alffi IS to mak[e] the weaker argument the stronger."42 Since Protago
ras does not believe that human beings have access to truth, we
~hould not take him to mean by "the stronger argument" the one that
IS truer when measured against some external truth standard. I~
stead, we must take him to mean the argument that most closely reIterates accepted human truth. To say that the aim of rhetoric is to ma~e
the weaker argument the stronger, then, is to say that rhetoric'S task IS
not only to challenge but to transform the dominant truths of a culture by articulating an alternative one.43
To t~ansform truth requires, according to the Sophists, attentiveness to tlffie and occasion. Since truth is bound by time and context,
any effort to transform it must be likewise constrained. Thus, John
Poulakos, scholar of sophistic rhetoric, argues that "The Sophists
stres~ed t~at ~peech must show respect to the temporal dimension of
the SItuatIOn It addresses, that is, it must be timely. In other words,
speech must take into account and be guided by the temporality ~f
the situation in which it occurs. "44 As kairotic discourse, rhetoric IS
obliged to speak into the particularities of the moment and, especially, the urgencies at hand. Indeed, as Poulakos argues, "what compels a rhetor to speak is a sense of urgency" and further, "to intervene
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and, with the power of the word, to attempt to end a crisis, redistribute justice, or restore order,"4s
Crucial here, however, is that any attempt to transform truth can
only be successful if it is spoken in the moment that calls it into being:
"ideas have their place in time and unless they are given existence,
unless they are voiced at the precise moment they are called upon,
they miss their chance to satisfy situationally shared voids within a
particular audience."46
By implication, then, when the particularities of the moment do
not call forth a rhetorical response, silence should be the order of the
~ay.47 An important implication of the kairotic dimension of rhetoric
1~ tha~ anyone who dares to speak into the moment does so at some
nsk ~mce "his timing might not coincide with the temporal needs of
th~ sltuation."48 The rhetorician may mistake the moment and, in so
domg, speak a discourse at the wrong time and, therefore, fail to
move the audience to an alternative truth.
In a similar manner, the Sophists recognized that rhetoricians
must be attentive to the formal demands of the occasion in which they
sp~ak. Audiences have expectations about the kind of rhetoric that
~UltS, say, a funeral versus a wedding versuS a typical Sunday mornmg worship service. According to the Sophists, for any rhetoric to be
successful in transforming accepted truth, it has to respond appropriately to the character of the occasion and the expectations of the audience. 49 As with kairos, pl'epon (or appropriateness to occasion) also involves risk: "If what is spoken is the result of a misreading on ~1e part
?f ~e rhetor, it subsequently becomes obvious to us: even ~o hIm, that
thIS was not the right thing to say. "'SO Likewise, "If sde~ce IS called f~r
and the response is speech, we have a rhetor misspeakmg to an audIence not ready to listen, or not ready to listen to what he has to say, or
ready to listen but not to the things he is saying."s1 Taken together,
then: kairos and prepon characterize rhetoric as discourse. that says
the .nght thing at the right time to transform accepted truth mto alternatlve truth.
. With all of this emphasis on the moment and the occasion, we
mlght think that sophistic rhetoric is all about the present and what
already exists. But this is not so. As we have already said, a key characteristic of sophistic rhetoric is its aim to make the weaker argument
the stronger, to displace dominant truths with alternative ones, to
transform the actual into the possible. Beginning in the here and now
an~ attentive to kairos and prepon, the rhetorician nevertheless "tries
to hft [the audience] from the vicissitudes of custom and habit and
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.
. an d new consetake them into a new place where new discovenes
quences can be made."52
.
b
In this way, sophistic rhetoric, whose only foundatIon can e
found in the exigencies of the moment and the expectations of the.~r
dience, seeks to transport its audience to the realm of the POSSl .e
wherein the limits of current time and space are transgressed by aspIration and hope.
.h
In this sophistic theory of rhetoric we hear deep resonances WI~
Anabaptism. Like Anabaptism, sophistic rhetoric understands tru
to be unruly and disruptive of the status quo. Moreover, like Anaba?tism sophistic rhetoric takes as its aim the encouragement of suc~ diSruption through public discourse. Given these resonances, w~ bnng a
sophistic (rather than philosophical) view of rhetoric to thIS prolegomenon for a stewardship rhetoric. Thus, in what folloWS we apply
the sophistic ideas of kairos and prepon to the question of what
should characterize Anabaptist parrhesia.

A RHETORIC OF STEWARDSHIP

He became angry, and said that what I advanced was only sophistry. : ..
Thereupon I said that Paul writes that we should not be shaken in nund,
neither by spirit nor by word, nor by letter, as sent from them; or ev~
though an angel from heaven should come, and teach us anything different
from what is written in the holy Gospel, he should be accursed. 53
-Martyrs Mirror
If one sought to identify the ethos of Anabaptism with a single
concept, that concept would surely be Gelassenheit. From sixtee~th
century Ar:abaptist martyrs to present-day Old Order Am.Ish,
Gelassenhelt characterizes a genuine Anabaptist posture in relationship to God. 54 Robert Friedmann argued that Gelassenheit beca~e
central to Anabaptist identity because it defined so well Anabaptist
faith in the context of persecution: "their own teaching of obedience
and discipleship almost required this attitude as the precondition of a
reborn soul to walk the narrow path. The idea of martyrdom becomes
bearable only on such a basis of self-surrender and joyous acceptance
of God's will. Only through Gelassenheit may suffering become the
royal road to God."55 Almost 1,500 years later, in a context largely d~
void of persecution, Old Order Amish identity features Geiassenhelt
as well. Donald Kraybill argues that Gelassenheit provides the key to
unlocking all the riddles of Amish culture:
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The solution to the riddle of Amish culture is embedded in the
German word Gelassenheit. Roughly translated, Gelassenheit
means 'submitting, yielding to a higher authority.' Rarely used
in speech, it is an abstract concept that carries a variety of spe~ific meanings-self-surrender, resignation to God's will, yieldIng to God and to others, self-denial, contentment, a calm
spirit."56
Yielding as Submission
At the heart of the various translations given for Gelassenheit is
the notion of yielding to God, to other, to community. Yielding is often
pa~red. with submission to get more fully at the meaning of Gelassen~eIt. Yieidedness as submission is a deeply biblical idea and one that
IS closely tied to how we are to receive God's gifts-or, put another
way, how we are to be stewards of God's gifts. Indeed, throughout the
~ld and New Testaments we learn that people who receive God's
gIfts are called to submission. This is so whether the gift received is
the whole creation (Adam and Eve), great expanses of land and many
descendants (Abraham), the deliverance of his people (Moses), the infant Messiah (Mary), or revelation (Paul).
In each case God calls the receiver of the gift to submit her life to
G.od's will in ways that are profoundly disruptive to her, her commumty, and even the social order. In the case of Mary, for instance, at the
~nnunciation she willingly submits all of her life to God upon hearll1g that she has found favor with God and will give birth to the Messiah: "Here am I, the servant of the Lord; let it be with me according to
your w?rd" (Luke 1:38). In her response to God's gift, ~ar~ gives herself e~h~ely to God's purpose setting no limits or quahflC~h?nS on her
submIssIOn to God's word. Of course, since she was a vlrgll1 and eng.aged to Joseph, her submission to God's plan compromised her soCIal position and, indeed, her whole life.
. ~ the same way, Paul responds to the gift of God's truth by submlttll1g his whole life so that he loses all his possessions and the value
system within which he treasured them. More importantly, he submi~s to a whole new understanding of salvation according to which
he IS required to abandon his once ardently held conviction that righteousness comes from obedience to the law and, instead, to develop
faith in the claim that salvation comes through following Jesus all the
way to the cross. Thus, Paul writes in Ephesians, "[flor his sake I have
suffered the loss of all things, and I regard them as rubbish, in order
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that I may gain Christ and be found in him, not having a righteousness of my own that comes from the law, but one that comes through
faith in Christ, the righteousness from God based on faith" ~3:8.-9). .
Paul's submission is important for stewardship rhetorIc smce In
his example we see how we are to respond to God's gift of truth and,
in particular, to the truth of the cross. For Anabaptists, as we have
noted more than once, the truth of the cross is the most important
truth. But that truth is not simply the conventional one-that by
Jesus' blood we are saved. Rather, as John Howard Yoder has taught
us, the cross (and with it always the resurrection) represents t~e
breaking of the sovereignty of the Powers who enslave uS to theu
truths and by their claim to be all powerfu1. 57
At the cross we are invited to see that the power claimed by the
Powers is a ruse and, thus, that the Powers are false gods. Once we see
that this is so and willingly submit (as Jesus did) to the truth that God
is sovereign even over the Powers, that the whole creation has already
been reconciled to God (in actuality, even if not apparently), then. ~e
are not only freed from the enslavement of the powers but free to Jom
58
in the reconciling work of the new creation that is the church. Wit.h
this truth as our gift, then, the submission to which we are called IS
obedience to a radically unruly truth that always promises to relativize all that we know, believe, and value.
As receivers of a gift such as this, a gift of truth that is radical and
unruly, what should be our posture as its stewards? If we take Paul as
our example, then we may say first of all that we are called to submit
all that we have and are to it. Like Paul we must be willing to give over
to this truth not only all of our possessions and the values by which
,:e treasure them but also, and more importantly, our deepest conv~c
hons. If we are to take as our task the dissemination of this truth as Its
rhet~r~ci~s, then we must be willing to subject all that we know to its
relahvlzmg power. The ethos of a stewardship rhetorician must be as
one who is always available to God's new truth truth we cannot yet
imagine but that is on the way. Indeed, we must'be relentlessly attentive to God's inbreaking revelation in our contemporary context no
matter how disruptive it may be of what has become obviously true
for us. If this is so, then our stewardship rhetoric must likewise be
available to the radically transformative force of God's next revelation. It cannot become too fixed or static. It must remain contingent on
what new word God is trying to give us.
But even as we submit to God's ongoing and unruly revelation
we are also called to submit to the truth we already know, the truth of
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the cross-namely, that victory over death and the Powers has al~ead y been won, the reign of God is among us, and, therefore, our task

IS not to force history to come out right.59 Rather, our task is to follow
Jesus by freely giving away the good news of that victory all the way
to the cross. If we submit to this truth as we submit to God's ongoing
revelation, then even as we energetically disseminate God's truth, we
cannot as stewardship rhetoricians force it on the other. In the end, we
are called as stewards of the truth that is Jesus Christ to yield to the
other's unbelief, even to the other's rebellion against God's truth.
Yielding as Cultivation
The constellation of terms used to capture the meaning of
Gelas~enheit includes yielding as well as resignation, self-surrender,
obedIence, contentment, and calm spirit. Taken together these terms
may suggest a posture that is passive not only in relationship to God
but to the whole world as well. Interestingly, however, the notion of
yielding entails not only submission but also cultivation in the sense
that ~ field yields a crop or a well placed financial investment ~ields a
p~ofIt. ~ultivation denotes careful tending toward the productlOn of a
YIeld. YIelding as cultivation is most surely not passive as it often in.
.
volves both planning and ongoing care.
Perhaps the biblical text that most strongly speaks of a YIeld culhvated out of God's truth is the great commission, wherein Jesus' follow~rs ~:e commanded by him to cultivate disciples ~to the bo~~ of
Chnst: Go therefore and make disciples of all natlOns, baptlzmg
them in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit,
and teaching them to obey everything that I have command,;d you.
And remember, I am with you always, to the end of the age (Matt.
28:19-.20) . Thus we are called not only to receive God's tr~th and to
subr~ut Our whole lives to it but, having done so, to help It grow by
mak~g, baptizing, and teaching disciples with this truth. Rather than
enter mto the complexities of missiological debate here about how
best to answer that commandment, we do well to remember Yoder's
argument that before perfecting our missiology, we are first called to
announce and to celebrate the reign of God. 6o
~o cultivate God's gift of truth, a stewardship rhetoric mus.t first
ta~e 111tO account the fact that, though victoriou~, th~t truth IS not
WIdely recognized. Indeed, the Powers do not belIeve m the truth of
~he cross and largely live and work in rebellion against it. In addressmg th~se who do not yet acknowledge the reign of God, stewa~dship
rhetonc must be mindful that its task is, as it was for the SophIsts, to
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make the weaker argument the stronger. This posture of ~~eaking
from the underside of conventional wisdom should be famihar fro~
Jesus' teachings and, of course, his work on the cross. As stewards~lp
rhetoricians, then, our aim is to disrupt the stronger argument WIth
the weaker argument of the truth of the cross.
To succeed in making the weaker argument of the cross appear
. . must b
' a~ the Sophists
· rh etoncian
egm
.
. d did
W
stronger, th e steward sh Ip
e
in a certain moment and place with a particular audIence m mm . d.
must begin amid all of the pre-existing beliefs and values of our au 1ence as well as the various constraints and realities of the present mOment. But although our stewardship rhetoric must begin there, it cannot remain there, since to do so would be merely to reproduce ~e ~ta
tus quo. Instead, in recognition of the timely (kairos) and the fIttmg
(prepon), but with attention focused on the gap between those who acknowledge the reign of God and those who yet do not, the stewardship rhetorician is called to craft appeals capable of articulating the
audience into the reign of God.
To craft a stewardship rhetoric able to move an audience from
obedience to the stronger argument which will always be the arg~,
h' hIS
ment of the Powers, to obedience to the weaker argument, w IC .
the reign of God, takes the utmost in rhetorical sensitivity and skill.
The stewardship rhetorician will like the Sophist need to be someone who is keenly perceptive of the present that sh~ and her audience
occupy and who can fashion out of a common language neW arguments and appeals on behalf of radical transformation.
These days we hear important calls for a certain kind of exchange
wi~ the other in which we may make our arguments to the best of our
abllity so long as we also make ourselves available to the trans form ~g power of the other's argument. 61 This is mutually transformative
dIalogue, we are told, and it is ethical insofar as both interlocutors are
ultimately willing to submit to the otherness of the other's argumen~.
To take up this posture is tempting because it seems to solve the ethIcal problem of advocacy. I can freely advocate my position without
having to worry ~hat I am somehow oppressing the other so long .as I
make myse~f available to the arguments of the other. But is it pOSSIble
or even desuable for me to assume that posture of availability to the
other's argument?
First, as. to its ~ossibility, how would I go about choosing to m~ke
myself avaIlable ill that way? By what psychological mechamsm
could I excise or bracket from my mind my deeply held convictio~s
such that I could hear the arguments of the other? Indeed, is my avall-
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ability to the other a question of choice? Is it possible for me to decide
that I will make myself available to radical transformation or, instead,
is radical transformation something that happens despite my own
volition? Second, as to its desirability, if my deeply held convictions
are faithful to the truth that is the cross, do I even want to make them
available to such radical transformation? We believe that it is neither
probable that faithful Christians can nor desirable that they should
bracket the truth of the cross.
Rather than try to make ourselves available to the arguments of
the other to solve the ethical problem of persuasion, the stewardship
rhetorician is obliged by the call to cultivation of God's gift of truth to
make her arguments as persuasively as she can in the context of the
moment and the situation. As she does so, she necessarily takes the
risks that she may have misunderstood the moment or the occasion
and, thus, misspeaks. She must risk the possibility that she may speak
when she should not, or that she may say the wrong thing. In addition
to ta~ing these risks, we propose that she take another-that is, that
she nsk the possibility that she will speak wrongly to the other, perhaps even to the point of oppressing the other. The stewardship
rhetorician must recognize that this is a possibility-that her speech
may coerce and that she may engage in moral error. Further, if she
does, then she must own that ethical failure.
To reduce the chances that she will make such an error, the stewardship rhetorician must consider carefully to whom, when, and
wher~ she speaks. Having a true word to say is not ~ufficient for
spea~mg it. The stewardship rhetorician will have to weIgh whether a
certam audience is in a moment and place in which it can hear that
word. If not, then the stewardship rhetorician should choose to remain silent and make the case another day. Importantly, then, the
choice of the stewardship rhetorician is not about adapting the. truth
to her audience to make it easier to take. Neither, however, IS her
choice about making certain that in speaking the truth, she guaran~ees that the audience knows she is willing to subject that truth to radIcal revision by the audience. Instead, it is about discerning the moment and knowing when to speak and when to rema~ silent.
. Of COurse, the stewardship rhetorician must receIve an~ ta~e sen~u~ly the arguments of the other. Again, however, the pomt m reCelvmg them is not to make the truth of the cross available to radical
transformation by the other's argument. Instead the point is to listen
to t~e argument of the other through the truth of the cross. If upon listenmg carefully to it, the stewardship rhetorician decides that the ar-
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g ument of the other is in rebellion against the truth of the cross, thedn
she is called to dissuade the other from it. In a dd 1't'lOn, the stewar ship rhetorician should listen for the ways in which the truth of thhe
. the other's argument. By l'IS tening for t e
cross may be troublmg
gaps or fissures within an argument and between one and ano:e~
argument, the stewardship rhetorician seeks to yield a new tru 0
the cross.
d'
With these last two points made about the cultivation of Go 5
gift of truth on the part of the stewardship rhetorician, we need to recall three crucial points previously made. This is so since these t~o
points about cultivation may seem to say that the stewards~lp
rhetorician is the lone advocate for a truth about which she is certa~.
This is not the case. First, if we remember that the stewardshIp
rhetorician only gains access to truth in the context of the bod~ ~f
Christ gathered around Scripture in the presence of the Holy Spmt,
then we know that she is not alone. On the contrary, she is accountable to that community for the truth she tells. Second, if we remember
that she (in th~ context of that community) always avails the truth she
knows to radIcal revision by God, then we know that she ho!ds ~:
truth of the cross humbly in relationship to the one who gIveS I .
Third, if we remember that she speaks truth always as the ~eake.r argumen~ to the. stronger, which is to say from below in a relationshIp of
power m SOCiety and history, then her unwillingness to make the
truth of the cross available to the radical transformation of the o~er
can be seen as ~ot an instance of domination by persuasion but, mstead, as a practIce of Witness.

CONCLUSION
Christ's servants follow him to death and give their body, life, and breath
on cross
and rack and pyre. As gold lS
' t rze
. d an d purzifi'ed they stand the
,( (: 62
test 0) ) lre.
-Ausbund Hymn

Robert Friedm~ lamented that as Mennonites have become accult.urated to a SOCIety that puts a premium on individualism ~nd
achleveme~t they have largely abandoned Gelassenheit. 63 Seemg
Gelassenhelt as too passive for engagement with the world, Mennonites who h~ve left behind What are often understood as the backward
and sectanan ways of the Old Orders reject yielding. But if we take
into account the two senses of yielding we have been developing
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here-that is, both submission to God and others and cultivation of
~he reign of God through persuasive speech-then even we MennonItes who want most to engage the world may imagine a posture or
ethos that embodies our sixteenth-century ancestors' identity in
Gelassenheit, but in a way that is neither passive nor sectarian.
That posture, of course, is the ethos of the stewardship rhetorician, characterized by submission to God and an unwillingness to coer~e the other. Adopting this posture is an act of faith and discipleShIp because it only makes sense to one who knows that the sovereignty of the Powers has been broken. But the ethos of the stewardship rhetorician is also, like Weaver's and the sixteenth-century Anabaptists, that of the parrhesiastes who speaks truth to power out of
duty and in the context of risk to cultivate the reign of God within the
church and beyond.
As we bring this essay to a close, we are reminded of the words of
a seventeenth-century stewardship rhetorician, Thieleman van
Braght, who endeavored to remind the acculturated Mennonites of
his t.ime. of the need for a reinvigorated faith based in submission and
cultIvatlOn. In the opening paragraph of the preface to The Bloody Theater or Martyrs Mirror, he warns his brothers and sisters in the faith
tha.t the story he has to tell is not pleasant, perhaps even irritating. He
WrItes:
But most beloved, do not expect that we shall bring you into GreClan theatres, to gaze on merry comedies or gay performances.
Here shall not be opened unto you the pleasant arbors and pleasure gardens of Atlas, Adonis or Semiramis .... True enough, we
shall lead you into dark valleys, even into the valleys of.death,
Where nothing will be seen but dry bones, skulls, and fnghtful
skeletons of those who have been slain; these beheaded, those
drowned, others strangled at the stake, some burnt, others broken on the wheel, many torn by wild beasts, half devoured: and
put to death in manifold cruel ways; besides, a great multitude
who having escaped death bear the marks of Jesus, their Savior,
on their bodies, wandering about over mountains and valleys,
through forests and wilderness, forsake of friends and kindred,
~obbed and stripped of all their temporal possessions, and living
111 extreme poverty.64
To be sure, stewardship rhetoric is not for the faint of heart. It is no
easier to speak than it is to hear and least of all to embody as an ongoing practice. But a cloud of witnesses has gone before us, whether
Jesus, the martyrs, or J. Denny Weaver, to show us not only the way,
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but that this way is the only way. As sisters and brothers in the body of
Christ we are called both to submission and to cultivation because, as
,
. 1 "the
the third-century church father Tertullian put it so conCIse y,
blood of the martyrs is the seed of the church."
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